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Abstract
Traditionally, the scholarly journal market operates so that research institutions
are charged high prices and the wider public is often excluded altogether, while
authors can usually publish for free and commercial publishers enjoy high prots.
Two forms of open access regulation can mitigate these problems: (i) authors are
required to publish in a journal which allows readers free and immediate access to
their article, or (ii) authors are required to make freely available an inferior substitute
to the published paper (and to publish in a journal which permits this). The former
policy is likely to result in authors paying to publish, which may lead to a reduction
in the quantity of published papers and may make authors less willing to publish in
selective journals. The latter policy makes freely available only an inferior version of
the published article, but may be consistent with authors publishing for free.
Keywords: publishing, journals, open access, two-sided markets, regulation.
A frequent claim is that many publishers charge readers too much to subscribe to
their scholarly journals. High prices have an adverse impact on both distributional and
e¢ ciency aims. Even if libraries are just willing to pay them, high subscription charges have
a welfare cost if a dollar of library budget is worth more than a dollar of publisher prot,
as is plausibly the case when libraries are nanced out of public funds.1 It is ine¢ cient
to exclude interested readers when it costs nothing to serve them. It may also be costly
in political terms to exclude readers, if those who ultimately pay for public research are
denied access to its nal product.
Department of Economics, University of Oxford. I am grateful to Vince Crawford, Stevan Harnad,
Doh-Shin Jeon, Justin Johnson, Al Klevorick, Mark McCabe, Richard Price, Alan Sorensen, Peter Suber,
John Vickers, Ivo Welch, John Willinsky, and Jidong Zhou, as well as to two referees, for helpful comments.
1As House of Commons (2004, page 5) put it: There is mounting concern that the nancial benets
from the Governments substantial investment in research are being diverted to an excessive degree into
the pockets of publishersshareholders.
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In broad terms, this paper argues that these concerns are valid and judicious policy
intervention in the journal market is worthwhile.2 There are a variety of forms of open
access. When a journal article is freely available to all readers at the time of publication,
this is usually termed goldopen access. If an author posts her own version of the paper
online (and publishes in a journal which permits this), this is greenopen access. Another
variant has the journal article freely available but only after an embargo period, sometimes
known as delayedopen access.3 An open access policy requires designated authors for
instance, those whose research was publicly funded to make their research open access in
a specied form.
In broad terms, journals are funded in one of two ways. The traditional subscription
journal sells its content to readers (usually libraries in universities and research institu-
tions). For instance, the journal Small has online institutional subscription for 2015 in the
USA for the sizable sum of $5256.4 Subscription journals often allow authors to publish
their work without charge, so that authors have free access to a journals readers. An open
access journal, by contrast, makes its content free to readers at the time of publication.
Such journals usually cover their costs by charging authors to publish their work.5 Thus,
anyone can read the article Jealousy in dogsin PLOS ONE for free, but its authors have
paid $1350 to publish there.
2Scholarly books are di¤erent from journals in a number of respects. For instance, authors are paid
to publish (royalty rates of between ve and fteen percent are common), and so have more at stake in
making readers pay for access. Relatedly, prots from book sales are in large part passed back to authors,
and so stay in the systemrather than being extracted by external publishers. Hard copy distribution
is still dominant, and prices for books have not risen nearly as fast as prices for journals. Policy-makers
at present do not usually require open access for scholarly books, although this may change as electronic
dissemination of books becomes widespread.
3Willinsky (2006, Appendix A) lists ten kinds of open access, which includes situations where the print
edition of a journal is paid for while its online edition is free, or when the journal is available for free
in poorer countries. Another form of partial open access is when an article appears in a subscription
journal which is cheap but not free. However, many proponents of open access do not allow any element
of delay or price (no matter how short or how low) to count as true open access.
4The Association of Research Libraries (2006, Table 2) reports that the median library in the association
spent about $6 million on journal subscriptions in 2005.
5A number of journals currently have neither subscription charges nor publication fees. Presumably,
these journals operate with funding from institutions or charities, and/or by editors and reviewers donating
their time. An extreme case was the old Bell Journal of Economics, which between 1970 and 1981 o¤ered
its content for free to anyone who asked (and this was in the days before electronic dissemination, when it
was costly to supply a hard copy to a reader) and paid its authors a substantial fee for publication. The
journals funder, Bell Labs, evidently felt it was worthwhile to spend money to attract good papers and to
disseminate those papers to the widest audience.
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Clearly, there are funding models intermediate between these extremes. Some journals
allow delayed open access, where content becomes freely available after an embargo, and
charge readers only if they want immediate access. The two most cited journals in the
world in 20096, Journal of Biological Chemistry and Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, follow this policy (with respective embargoes of twelve months and six months).7
Journals are collections of articles, some of which could be author-funded and others reader-
funded. A hybrid journal sells some content to subscribers, but o¤ers its authors an
option to pay to make their article open access. Thus, the Economic Journal currently has
online institutional subscription in the UK for £ 477, and authors can make their article
free to readers by paying £ 1500.
In the next section, I discuss the journal market in more detail. I discuss how modern
technology has reduced journal costs, and helped to boost revenue, so that publisher prots
have risen in recent years. I also discuss how the internet acts to disintermediate the
interaction between authors and readers. Authors can post their work online, which can
be freely accessed by readers using general search tools. Author reputations are increasingly
determined by citations as well as where they publish, and readers can use online metrics
(citations, downloads, and so on) to guide them to the most important research. As a result,
a journals traditional roles to disseminate and to certify the importance of research
may be less important now. Section 2 discusses some of the main pros and cons of open
access policies, building on a pair of theoretical models which are presented in detail in
an appendix in section 5. Section 3 provides a brief history of open access in publishing,
including recent policy to widen access to scholarly work in the UK. Section 4 summarises
the main arguments concerning the various forms of policy intervention, and suggests that
in the near term most of the benets of open access can be obtained with a partial open
access policy, which avoids the disruption that a gold policy with expensive author fees is
likely to bring.
6See archive.sciencewatch.com/dr/sci/09/aug2-09_2.
7The journal Microbiology of the Cell currently has an embargo period of just two months before its
own content is made freely available, and supplements its subscription revenue by charging authors as well.
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1 Traditional Journals and their Alternatives
1.1 The purpose of a journal
Traditional journals provide a number of benets to their authors and readers, including:
(i) preparing the denitive typeset version of a paper; (ii) certifying a papers quality via the
journals reputation for selectivity; (iii) improving the original manuscript by suggestions
from reviewers and editors, and (iv) distributing the published paper to those (and only
those) permitted to read it.
Task (i) is useful for readers, and necessary for fellow researchers who need to cite the
paper accurately. In the era when authors prepared manuscripts on typewriters, typesetting
by publishers was a valuable improvement to the appearance of the paper, especially for
technical material. Nowadays, though, word processing software allows authors to prepare
clean copy on their own computer, and typesetting by publishers provides less value-added.
It remains useful, however, for a reader to know she has the very nal version of a paper.
Task (ii) is important to both authors and readers. Traditionally, an author attempts
to place her article in the most discriminating journal willing to accept it. As a result,
a journal provides a signal of the articles quality, which is important for authors, who
benet from being seen to be able to publish in a top journal, and to potential readers
who are guided to the most worthwhile work. Even if they do not have a subscription to
the published paper itself, readers have open accessto the journals certication service,
since it is easy to discover the host journal via an authors CV, journal homepages and the
like.
Fellow researchers in an authors eld will often have a good idea of her skills, regardless
of where her work appears. However, an author cares about her reputation more widely
than this. For instance, decisions about salary, tenure, job o¤ers, research grants, and the
Nobel Prize are made by people outside this inner circle, who will rely more on external
cues such as where the author has published. Moreover, even researchers in the same eld
may not know of the author, especially if she is located in a peripheraldepartment, and
placing a good paper in a good journal may be a way to advertise her entry to the eld.
All in all, many authors would happily pay a good deal of their own money to place an
article in a prestigious journal.
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The journal in which a paper appears is an important guide also to potential readers.
A reader cannot judge how good a paper is until she reads it, so that a paper is an
experience good. Given that reading a paper involves a sunk cost, a reader benets from
ex ante information about a papers quality before deciding to read. In the pre-internet era,
searching for useful papers was a hit-and-miss a¤air, and as a form of triage it was often
e¢ cient for a busy researcher to conne her search to a small number of elite and specialist
journals. For this reason, being published in a prominent journal helped boost a papers
readership, even among those readers able to access most journals at their institution.
The internet provides additional cues about a papers likely quality. Data about the
number of papers which cite a particular article are freely available on scholarly search
engines such as Google scholar, and these are arguably as good a signal of quality as the
host journals reputation for selectivity once some time has passed.8 After all, the decision
to publish a paper in a journal is typically made by an editor and couple of referees, while
a well-cited paper has some kind of approval from many readers.9 To the extent that the
wisdom of crowdscan certify a papers quality, the certication role of journals becomes
less necessary.
Citation data increasingly play a role in hiring and promotion decisions, and a well-
cited paper in a mediocre journal nowadays carries much weight in committees. It is even
possible that journal editors use the number of citations a submitted paper has garnered as
a working paper to inuence their decision whether to accept. Readers as well as employers
can use citation and download data on the internet as a guide to likely quality. A good
paper which, for whatever reason, failed to appear in a good journal now has a better
chance of being picked up by subsequent researchers, if they nd it listed high up in the
Google scholar search results page. There appears to be a trend that the fraction of the
8There has been citation data available long before Google scholar, for instance on Web of Science.
However, the former has a number of advantages, including ease of use, the fact it includes working
papers and other non-journal material as well as published articles, and the fact that it is currently free.
(Institutional subscription costs for Web of Science are non-trivial. Cornell University reports it pays
$155,000 per year for access see John Bohannon, Google scholar wins ravesbut can it be trusted?,
Science 343, page 14, January 2014.)
9Moreover, Welch (2014) reports that refereesrecommendations are not strongly correlated. He ob-
tained anonymized data from eight prominent economics and nance journals He found that the uncon-
ditional probability a referee was positive about a paper was 31%, while if the other referee was positive
the conditional probability rose only slightly to 34%.
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most-cited articles which appear in the most-cited journals is decreasing.10 Of course,
though, journals will continue to play an important role in determining a papers impact.
For instance, being published in a prestigious journal may generate the early citations, and
this early advantage is amplied when later researchers use citations to guide their choice
of reading.11
A recent development is the entry of so-called megajournals (also known as reposi-
toryjournals), mostly in the science area. These journals have very broad scope in terms
of subject matter, with peer-review policies markedly less stringent, and less costly, than
those of a traditional selective journal. The most successful of these is PLOS ONE, whose
editorial policy states: Too often a journals decision to publish a paper is dominated by
what the editor/s think is interesting and will gain greater readership  both of which are
subjective judgements and lead to decisions which are frustrating and delay the publica-
tion of your work. PLOS ONE will rigorously peer-review your submissions and publish
all papers that are judged to be technically sound. Judgements about the importance
of any particular paper are then made after publication by the readership (who are the
most qualied to determine what is of interest to them).This journal currently accepts
about 70% of submissions, has a respectable impact factor of 3.73 for 2013, and in 2012 it
published 23,464 articles, making it probably the largest journal in the world.12
Publishing in a mega-journal is a strategy intermediate between publishing in a tradi-
tional selective journal and just posting a working paper on the internet. Readers know
they have the denitive version of the paper, and with the modest degree of quality control
10For instance, Acharya et al. (2014) document with Google scholar metrics that the number of the
top-1000 most cited articles in a variety of broad subject areas which were published in the top-10 most
cited journals has, on average, fallen from 851 to 755 between 1995 and 2013. However, one reason for this
trend may be that papers have become longer in recent years, and there are fewer papers now published
in the top-10 journals.
11More generally, in situations with observational learning where an agent is more likely to choose
what earlier agents have been seen to choose early advantages matter a lot, and there is a danger of
ine¢ cient herding. Just as people only reading novels on the best-seller list or diners choosing to eat only
in crowded restaurants may lead to desirable options being ignored, so might easy access to citation and
download data lead to undue focus on a few articles fortunate to gain early prominence. See Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) for a model in which agents ignore their own signal of the quality of an option
if they see enough earlier agents have made the opposite choice, with the result that a good option may
be ine¢ ciently ignored.
12See www.plosone.org/static/information (accessed 26 February 2014). The journal reports download
statistics, reader comments, media coverage and social media sharesfor each of its articles, which help
to signal likely quality.
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they can be fairly condent that there is nothing wrongor duplicative about the paper
before they decide whether to read it. Mega-journals also provide e¢ ciency gains in terms
of refereeing e¤ort. Since a reasonable paper is likely to be accepted at such a journal, it
will be refereed just once. Historically, by contrast, an author would often work her way
through journals of decreasing prestige until one agreed to publish her paper, generating
a new set of referee comments at each stage.13 The fact that a paper is more likely to be
accepted at the rst attempt also means that it is published more quickly than when the
author submits sequentially to several journals, which is obviously of benet to readers.
In practice, mega-journals are open access, though one can also imagine a subscription
journal having an editorial policy similar to PLOS ONEs.14
Some journals do not supply credible certication services at all. There is a market for
vanitypublishing, and many journals will publish almost anything including plagiarised
or self-plagiarised work in return for a fee from the author. These journals often market
themselves as open access, although they have minimal readership and could not generate
much subscription revenue if they tried. Dishonest, desperate, or inexperienced authors
are willing to pay to have a plausible publication on their CV which would not get through
a peer-review process.15 (The model in section 5.2 describes an unregulated journal market
which has reputable subscription journals and worthless author-pays journals coexisting.)
Task (iii) is not unanimously viewed as a benet by either authors or readers. In many
subject areas the revision process has become increasingly costly for authors, both in terms
of time and e¤ort. Ellison (2002a) reports that several decades ago the typical time from
submission to acceptance in top economics journals was just a few months, and requests
for substantive revisions were rare. In 1999, though, the average time from submission to
13In addition, one of the motivating examples in Bikhchandani et al. (1992) was sequential refereeing:
a referee who knows that the paper was previously rejected elsewhere might be inclined to reject even if
she has a positive view of the paper.
14A major reason is probably that mega-journals are new journals, and most new journals have to be
open access to succeed. Because of tight library budgets, a librarys margin is usually to decide which
journals to cancel rather than which subscription journals to add.
15See Beall (2012) for more details. (Beall currently maintains a list of dubious journals on his webpage.)
Bohannon (2013) reports the outcome of an interesting investigation. He concocted a awed paper about a
new cancer treatment, which he plausibly suggests would not be passed by a credible peer-review process,
sent the paper under a variety of assumed names to 304 open access journals. The paper was accepted by
157 (including journals published by Elsevier, Kluwer and Sage), rejected by 98, while the remaining 49
had not responded by the time the investigation went to press.
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acceptance in most top economics journals was two years, plus another wait for publication
itself. (If the author has to submit her paper to more than one journal, the delay stretches
on further still.) Alongside this, published papers have become longer, and now have
lengthy introductions, various extensions of the basic model, and cite more papers.16 While
this process of revisions is costly for authors, it is also costly for readers who want timely
access to the latest published research, even if there is free and immediate access to the
work when eventually published. While the revision process sometimes improves a paper,
especially one submitted from an inexperienced author, a good case can be made that the
process has got out of hand. The mega-journals discussed above are a natural vehicle for
authors who wish to publish in outlets which allow them to present their work to readers
as they see t and without undue delay. However, there is no reason why a more selective
journal could not also follow something like a limited revisionspolicy.17
Task (iv) is most directly relevant to the open access debate. Authors typically put a
lot of weight on the size and composition of their readership, in order to generate career-
enhancing citations and generally increase their visibility. However, while they care about
reaching their peers (who are the only readers likely to generate citations), authors plausibly
care less about reaching the wider publicand would be unwilling to pay a substantial
publication fee out of their own pocket or limited research funds to do so.18
Nevertheless, there are benets to the wider public gaining timely access to scholarly
16Some of this extra length might be because over time the related literature can become larger and
more complex. Ellison (2002b, Tables 1 and 2) documents similar trends in other subjects. Although the
direction of the trend is similar in most subjects, in many science journals the timescale from submission
to acceptance is vastly shorter relative to that in economics. McAfee (2010, page 5) writes: we have
transformed the business of refereeing from the evaluation of contributions with a little grammatical help
into an elaborate system of glacier-paced anonymous co-authorship.
17See McAfee (2010) for an account of one economics journals policy to o¤er authors the option that
their paper would either be accepted or rejected as is, without possibility of substantial revision. (This
option was requested by 35% of submitting authors.)
18House of Commons (2004, page 9) quotes the UKs Royal Society of Chemistry as saying most authors
care where their work is seen and who it is seen by far more than they care about how many people have
seen it. Of course, there are many potential subscribers who are intermediate between large research
libraries and the wider public. Smaller, or less research-focussed, institutions may be unable or unwilling
to pay the high subscriptions asked by publishers. Excluding these institutions is likely to harm authors
in terms of lost citations, and likely to cause more harm to these readers than excluding a member of
the wider public. Strieb and Blixrud (2013) report the take up of journals by research libraries in North
America. While in 2012 almost all (96%) libraries subscribed to some collection of Wiley journals, only
19% obtained its complete set. (The respective gures for Elsevier are 92% and 23%.)
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material.19 For example, a provincial lawyer might learn about relevant case law, journalists
write better-informed articles, or history teachers in schools give better classes. Amateur
astronomers benet from access to journals, and in turn contribute to science themselves.
Small-scale innovators nd it useful to consult scholarly material but cannot a¤ord to pay
much for it.20 Probably the scholarly topic of widest interest to the public is health and
medicine, and millions every day search online for up-to-date information in this area.21
Not surprisingly, putting content behind a pay-wall does appear to make a signicant
di¤erence to readership (as proxied by the number of downloads), but less so for citations.
Davis (2011) secured the agreement of 36 subscription journals to select randomly about
one-quarter of their articles for open access treatment. He found that during the rst
year after publication, the open access articles were downloaded more (115% more for
HTML downloads and 62% more for pdf downloads) than their subscription counterparts,
and accessed by 31% more unique visitors. However, he found no signicant di¤erence in
citation rates for the three years after publication for the two groups. He interprets these
results as consistent with readers of scholarly work falling into two groups: those who work
in research universities, who provide most of the citations and have access to most journals
in any event, and others who consume but rarely contribute to the corpus.22
As with task (ii), task (iv) can often be bypassed by authors and readers by means
of the internet. An author can post (self-archive) a version of her paper on a public
19See Willinsky (2006, chapter 8) and Suber (2012, section 5.5) for a more detailed discussion.
20Houghton et al. (2011) conducted interviews with 23 smaller research-oriented businesses in Denmark.
Some of these businesses subscribe to the most relevant journals, most regularly consult open access
material on the internet (in repositories or in open access journals), and some ask contacts in universities
to provide them with content. Most report di¢ culties gaining access to recent research.
21Some try to use the publics interest in heath as an argument against open access. House of Commons
(2004, page 25) quotes a representative of Wiley as saying this rather enticing statement that everybody
should be able to see everything could lead to chaos. Speak to people in the medical profession, and they
will say the last thing they want are people who may have illnesses reading this information, marching
into surgeries and asking things.
22There is now a huge literature looking at the interaction between ease of access and download/citation
rates see the long footnote 6 in Suber (2012, page 178). A problem throughout is how to isolate the e¤ect
of opening access per se on subsequent readership. For example, older studies found a large impact on
citations from having an article in an open access journal or repository, but this might be due to authors
putting their best work in such journals. In the study cited, it is possible that readers mistakenly took
the label open access as a signal that such papers were particularly good (for instance, because only
highly-regarded scholars had research funds to pay for open access). In addition, it is possible that readers
who were put o¤ by subscription charges went on to download a self-archived version from elsewhere, so
that total downloads from all sources was not so di¤erent for the two groups of article.
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website, such as her own webpage, her institutions or funding bodys repository, or a
subject-specic repository.23 Even if these various websites are not prominent themselves,
search tools such as Google scholar enable easy location of works by specic authors, titles
or topics. Di¤erent versions of a published paper which might be self-archived are the pre-
submitted (or working paper or preprint) version, the accepted (or postprint)
version which incorporates reviewer comments but which is still the authors own version
in terms of formatting, and the nal published version as typeset by the journal.
Of course, an author is always permitted to post a working paper on a webpage before
she submits to a journal. (Authors have copyright until they assign it to someone else.)
However, many prominent medical journals use the so-called Ingelnger Rule, and will not
consider a paper for publication if it has previously been posted on the internet, which
severely deters preliminary circulation of papers.24 Unless the article is published with
open access (either in an open access journal or in a hybrid journal where the author had
paid to make the paper open access), a journal will rarely allow an author to post its
own version immediately on a public webpage. Whether the authors own version of the
accepted paper can immediately be self-archived varies widely from publisher to publisher
and over time. If the accepted version is self-archived at the same time as publication (or
even before publication), the benets of task (iii) are freely enjoyed by readers and there
is de facto open access for readers. A reader can check the likely quality of a paper by
discovering which journal it appears in and go on to read the near-identical free version
online, much as a consumer gets product advice in a bricks-and-mortar store and goes on
to buy the product more cheaply online. In such cases, readers who choose to pay for the
published version do so in large part for the limited aesthetic benets of task (i) and the
peace of mind that one is reading the very nal version.
Despite the danger of cannibalizing their subscription revenues, traditional subscription
journals have an incentive to permit a degree of self-archiving (or alternatively, to make
their own content freely available after some delay).25 This is because this helps to attract
23In fact, some subject repositories do charge readers for access. In economics, this is currently the case
with NBER and CEPR working papers.
24Franz Ingelnger was the editor of the New England Journal of Medicine who formalized this policy
in 1969, in part to maximize the newsworthiness of articles at the time of publication and in part to
limit the circulation of medical research before it has been peer-reviewed.
25Self-archiving can be done with or without permission from the journal. Indeed, authors have an
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authors and also because wider readership will boost citations and impact factors, which in
turn helps publishers market their journals to libraries.26 Conceivably, the authors version
and the publishers version might even be complements, if a reader samplesthe authors
version for free and if she likes it she goes on to read the published version.27
While publishers often permit self-archiving, it is quite another matter for authors
voluntarily to do so. Self-archiving involves a modest cost of time and e¤ort to the au-
thor (especially the rst time it is done), and if an author believes that her article is
disseminated to her desired audience by the journal anyway, she may not view the task as
worthwhile. Economics is something of an outlier, along with mathematics, physics and
computer science, in having a widespread working paper culture, and this is one reason
why discussions about open access are more muted in economics than in other subjects.
Presumably, one reason why economists are more likely to self-archive is the long delay in
publishing in their journals, as discussed earlier.28
1.2 The cost and revenue of a journal
These tasks cost money. Indeed, in the past even the most prestigious journals had di¢ culty
making ends meet.29 Throughout much of the last century, journals in scientic disciplines
incentive to be careless about their copyright obligations, since they do not receive the subscription
income and illegal distribution will boost their visibility and citations. Many economists appear to post
the journal article itself on their own webpage, in most cases in conict with the copyright agreement made
with the publisher. A grey area is what counts as the accepted versionof a paper. If a journal stipulates
that the accepted version can be self-archived only after 24 months embargo, an author in practice might
immediately self-archive a version which is in essence the nal version minus some minor revisions which
are immaterial to the reader.
26For similar reasons, suppliers of music, movies or software may be prepared to tolerate a degree of
piracy. In markets with network e¤ects, for instance, allowing some piracy to occur causes a rm to expand
its base of users, which enables it to charge more to legitimate buyers. See Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006)
for a survey of this literature.
27Finch et al. (2012, para. 7.67) reports evidence that providing access to articles via repositories with
high-quality metadata may lead to a marginal increase in downloads from the publishers site. Suber
(2012, section 5.3) discusses the complementarity between electronic and hard-copy book formats.
28Bergstrom and Lavaty (2007) investigate a number of economics journals to discover the proportion
of published papers which were freely available online in some form. They nd that the proportion tends
to fall o¤ for less prestigious journals, but for the top 15 journals about 90% of articles were available
as working paper versions (though not necessarily the accepted version). They nd less propensity to
self-archive in political science, where only 30% of published articles at that time were freely available.
29Berg (1971, p. 799) writes that in the 1880s, university subsidies and voluntary labor were essential
to the nancial viability of the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Journal of Political Economy.
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levied charges on both sides of the market to boost their revenues.30 However, changes in
technology mean that important aspects of costs have fallen dramatically in recent years,
while a journals ability to generate revenue has grown.
It is now essentially costless to distribute journal articles to additional readers over the
internet, while before publishers had to print and send hard copies. Likewise, a librarys
storage costs for electronic journals is zero. Electronic distribution is now the dominant
way for readers in developed countries, and increasingly in poorer countries, to access
journal articles. Editorial software is nowadays cheaply available, which reduces the costs
of managing the submission and peer-review process (perhaps removing the need for a
secretary and o¢ ce premises).31 Word processing software means that most authors can
prepare their own documents in a professional manner, which could reduce a journals
typesetting costs.
As discussed in more detail in section 2, the monopoly nature of each article enables a
subscription journal to set high prices to readers which need not be related to underlying
costs, and this was true even before the internet. The entry of commercial publishers into
the journal market during the second half of the last century has led to a greater focus
on prots, and less squeamishness in generating those prots.32 Since it costs nothing to
supply electronic journals to additional readers, a commercial publishers ideal outcome is
to serve all readers and to fully extract each readers surplus from its journals, the strategy
known as rst degreeprice discrimination. Such a strategy not only yields maximum
revenue to the publisher from its readers, but achieves the maximum audience for its
authors.
While this outcome cannot be perfectly achieved, publishers often get close. A publisher
can condition its subscription charge on the size and nature of the institution it supplies
30In the context of the model in section 5.1, this situation corresponds to the case where expression (2)
is not satised. Barton (1963) reports how the Physical Review faced nancial di¢ culties in the 1920s.
(Dues and subscription rates had been increased, but this process could not be continued [...] without
risking so great a decline in members and subscribers that the total income would be reduced rather than
raised.) As a result, in 1930 the journal introduced an author per-page charge of $2. In subsequent
decades, the practice was followed by several other journals in physics, chemistry and biology.
31For instance, the licence for Editorial Express, journal management software used by many journals
in the social sciences, costs just $2000 per year. (See editorialexpress.com, visited 20 March 2014.)
32Dewatripont et al. (2006) document how journal prices were rising faster than book prices in the
pre-internet era, and argue this may be due to the increased share of journals owned by commercial
publishers.
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or the wealth of the country. Electronic distribution means that a publisher can monitor
download activity, which helps it nely tune its prices to institutions over time. Electronic
distribution also makes it easy for publishers to bundle their journals into a collection
which they sell as a package to libraries. For the same reason that a diversied portfolio
has a more predictable return to investors, a publisher is better able to predict a librarys
willingness-to-pay for a large collection of journals than for any individual title. As such, a
publisher with many journals is better able to extract a librarys surplus from the collection
without much risk of the library cancelling its subscription. The result of all this price
discrimination is that librariesbudgets are squeezed, but more journals are available in
libraries than ever before.33
One necessary input for a journal does not cost it anything, and that is the paper
itself. Since the birth of scientic publishing, the norm is not to pay authors for their
articles, although it is not precisely clear from where this norm arises or why it persists.34
(Perhaps if one journal breaks rank and o¤ers to pay authors to publish, it would attract
a disproportionate fraction of duplicative or low quality work from authors?) Because
journals do not pay authors for their work, the revenues from selling subscriptions to
libraries are not passed back to authors but retained as super-normal prots. Commercial
publishers can indeed be highly protable. Reed-Elseviers 2013 Annual Report (page 12)
shows that its scientic, technical and medicaldivision made prot of £ 826m on revenues
of £ 2126m, a margin of 39%.35
A journals cost per article published will vary substantially, depending on how selective
the journal is. Some time ago, House of Commons (2004, page 74) reported that Wiley
33Association of Research Libraries (2006, Graph 2) shows that in the period 1986-2004, their member
librariesexpenditure on journals rose by more than 300%, while the average number of journals available
in a library rose by 42%. Bergstrom et al. (2014) reveal, via freedom of information requests, some of the
prices charged by publishers for their bundles of journals, which vary widely from institution to institution.
(For example, they nd that the average research-intensive library pays about $1.2 million for Elseviers
collection.)
34This is not to say that authors are not nancially rewarded when they publish, only that the payment
does not come from the publisher. Shao and Shen (2011, Table 1) describe an incentive scheme at Zhejiang
University in China which rewards authors according to an explicit scheme based on the impact factor of
the journal. (For instance, the lead author of a paper in Nature or Science would receive 200,000 RMB,
the current equivalent of about £ 20,000.) More common is an implicit incentive scheme, where scholars
who publish well get promoted or o¤ered better jobs.
35Page 14 of the Annual Report says there were about 700 million downloads in the year, so that its
average revenue per download was around £ 3.
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suggested $1500 would be the lowest cost per article, and its more selective journals would
have higher costs than this. Nature suggested that its cost per article was in the range
$10,000 to $30,000 because of its 90% rejection rate. Author fees at open access journals
provide some guide to the cost of publishing an article; these fees at the various PLOS
journals currently vary between $1350 for the PLOS ONE mega-journal and $2900 for the
highly selective PLOS Biology.
It is something of a puzzle why more journals, especially very selective journals, do
not use non-refundable submission fees to deter speculative submissions which stand little
chance of eventual success and which apparently are so costly to process. If submitting
is free, even an author who believes it is unlikely her article will be accepted may try her
luck with an elite journal. If a submission fee is imposed, the pool of submissions will be
tilted towards papers which are more likely to be accepted, and so reduce the journals
costs per article published.36 Relatedly, the long process of extensive revisions discussed
in the previous section is presumably costly, and a move towards pure certication rather
than referee co-authorshipwill reduce journal costs, as well as provide other e¢ ciency
gains.
2 Some Pros and Cons of Open Access
Like several other problematic markets the journal market is an instance of what I have
elsewhere termed a competitive bottleneck.37 Authors provide content to interested
readers, and gain exposure and citations by being read, and journals traditionally mediate
much of the interaction between the two sides. However, there is an important asymmetry
between authors and readers, which is that the peer-review process usually ensures an arti-
cle is only published in a single journal and is strongly di¤erentiated from other published
articles.38 Each published article thus constitutes a mini-monopoly, and a journal enjoys
36See section 3 of the 2004 Wellcome Trust report on Costs and business models in scientic research
publishing for further discussion of this point.
37See Armstrong (2002, section 3.1, and 2006, section 5), as well as Rysman (2009) for an overview of
two-sided markets.
38This asymmetry is masked in theoretical models of publishing with just a single journal. In the jargon
of two-sided markets, authors single-home, while readers must multi-home(i.e., have access to several
journals) if they wish to see a range of content. The peer-review process also forces authors to cite relevant
articles, which drives up demand by authors for access to published work.
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market power in providing access by readers to its articles.39 For this reason, a journal
is able to set high subscription charges which bear little relation to its cost of running a
journal, and to use some of the resulting prots to o¤er free service to authors.40
As mentioned earlier, an important feature of the journal market is that publishers do
not usually pay authors for their work. As a result, the most generous deal a publisher
can o¤er is that an author can publish for free. Since authors are not paid, the large
revenues from selling subscriptions to institutions are not easily dissipated and commercial
publishers can enjoy super-normal prots. From this perspective, high subscription fees
and excess publisher prots are due mostly to the monopoly nature of each individual
article, not to some more aggregate measure of concentration in the journal market.41
Other markets with similar features include credit cards (which consumers can often use
for free if they pay in full each month, while merchants pay high fees on each transaction),
shopping malls (which consumers can enter for free, while retailers pay high rents for access
to these consumers), search engines (where people can search for free, but advertisers pay
high prices to appear prominently in their search results), and call termination on telephone
networks.42 In most of these markets, there is a constraint that the side which is treated
39As it was put in the opening editorial to the open access journal PLOS Biology (Brown et al. (2003,
page 2)): each journal has a monopoly on a resource vital to scientiststhe unique collection of articles
it has published. Anyone who depends on the information in a specic article has no choice but to pay
whatever price the publisher asks.
40This pattern of cross-subsidy would be reversed in an alternative world in which readers each subscribed
to a single journal, and authors had to place their work in multiple journals in order to reach a large
readership. In that world, readers would be courted by journals, and authors pay high fees for access to
the captive readers. This alternative situation is akin to the newspaper market, where most people read a
single newspaper, and advertisers have to place their advert in multiple outlets to reach the desired number
of eyeballs.
41However, having a portfolio of many journals may help a publisher obtain yet higher prots, due
to its ability to engage in bundling. Dewatripont et al. (2006, Table 3) reports market shares in terms
of citations received for the major publishers. In a few subject areas (chemistry, engineering) there is
signicant concentration, but otherwise concentration does not seem extreme.
42Consider this last market in its parallels with journal publishing in more detail. People usually sub-
scribe to a single mobile telephone network (just as an author publishes her article in one journal), and
anyone who wishes to call a particular subscriber has to pay whatever termination chargeis demanded
by that subscribers network (just as anyone who wishes to read a published article has to pay what that
journal demands). Telephone subscribers may care about the volume of calls they receive (just as authors
care about the size of their readership), which will induce their network to temper high prices for call
termination somewhat. Without regulation, revenues from call termination in a competitive market are
passed back to subscribers in the form of a subsidized or free handset (just as prots from readers fund
free publishing for authors).
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generously cannot actually be paid, although the reasons for this constraint seem easier to
grasp than why authors cannot be paid by journals.
A model of an unregulated publishing market with these elements is presented in detail
in section 5.1. While that model allows for an elastic supply of authors and readers, its
essence is captured in the following simple example. Imagine rst a world without journals.
Author A obtains a benet of $10 when reader R sees her article, while R gains benet $10
from reading As article. It costs A some small but positive amount to deliver the article
to R (say, the e¤ort of posting the article online), and so she is willing to do this. The
joint surplus from this exchange, which involves no monetary transfer, is therefore about
$20. Now introduce a journal J, who o¤ers to deliver the article to R without charge to
A, an o¤er A accepts as it reduces her own costs of delivery. J then can charge R a fee of
$10 to gain access to As article. The combined surplus of A and R falls from about $20 to
$10 (all of which is enjoyed by A), the di¤erence being siphoned o¤ by J.43 While in this
simple example overall e¢ ciency is not a¤ected by the journals pricing, more generally
high prices set by journals will ine¢ ciently reduce readership.
A gold open access regime, in which regulated authors must publish in journals which
make their articles freely available at the time of publication, entirely overcomes the prob-
lem of monopoly pricing by journals. Journals would then usually have to cover their
running costs by charging regulated authors a fee to publish their paper. Like more famil-
iar one-sidedmarkets, journals would then compete for custom from authors in terms of
publication fee, quality of articles accepted, turnaround time, value-added from the refer-
eeing process, and so on, and there is a greater chance that only normal prots would be
observed.44
43Suppose that journals can pay A for her article. If there were several journals competing for As
article, each with the same small cost for delivering the article to R, competition forces them to o¤er
the maximum payment compatible with breaking even, which involves a payment to A of just under $10.
Journal prots are zero, and the joint surplus of A and R remains unchanged at the pre-journal level of
about $20, although now the author enjoys all the gains from the interaction.
44As Brown et al. (2003, page 2) put it: Open access would eliminate monopolies over essential
published results, diminishing prot margins and creating a more e¢ cient market for scientic publishing.
There remains the danger that network e¤ects may lead to market power. (See the parable of the
anarchistsannual meetingin Bergstrom, 2001.) For instance, if many readers only look at a few journals
because they think all the good articles are published there, an author of a good paper must publish in
one of those journals if her article is to be noticed and such journals could charge high publication fees to
authors. Open access policy on its own can do little to overcome this coordination problem.
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While a gold policy deals with monopoly pricing, the fact that authors will likely have
to pay to publish introduces its own problems. Paying to publish will deter some authors
at the margin from publishing at all.45 Even if many authors have access to funds which
can be used to cover a publication fee, there will often be an opportunity cost when paying
to publish a paper.46 (Paying to publish an article might mean the author can attend one
less conference, say, or the available funds might be su¢ ciently for only a subset of the
authors papers.) Scholars will have di¤erential access to subsidies to pay for publication
charges, with much science research being funded from grants which build in publication
fees, while scholars in the humanities more rarely have research grants. Of course, not
publishing at all is even more harmful to potential readers than paying a high price for
access.
A partial (that is, a green or delayed) open access regime, which instead focusses on
making freely available an inferior version of the published article, partly overcomes the
problems of high subscription charges and excluded readers.47 That an inferior substitute
is freely available implies that libraries have a reasonable outside option, and publishers
are forced to charge less if they wish to continue selling subscriptions.48 The wider public
has free access to an inferior variant of the published article, while before they may have
been excluded altogether. Nevertheless, if the inferior variant is not too close a substitute,
publishers may still be able to extract su¢ cient revenue from libraries willing to pay for
the premium published version to cover costs, albeit with less to spare, and so a partial
open access policy may be consistent with authors continuing to publish for free. In the
model in section 5.1 we see that a gold open access policy dominates a partial policy if the
45To take an extreme example, if authors of economics textbooks had to pay to publish, rather than be
paid, the supply of new textbooks would surely diminish.
46Solomon and Björk (2012, Tables 5 and 6) report that signicant number of authors do pay publication
fees out of their own pocket, especially when the fee is below $1000 and when the author comes from a
poorer country.
47Another partial policy is to permit regulated authors to publish in cheap, though not quite free,
journals. Such a policy reduces the prices paid by institutions and opens up access to smaller or poorer
institutions, but is unlikely to open access all the way to the wider public.
48Finch et al. (2012, para. 7.67) mentions a survey of librarians asked for their response if journal
content became freely available after a six month embargo period. Apparently 10% would then cancel
all subscriptions to science, technology and medicine journals and 23% would cancel all subscriptions to
humanities and social science journals. Of course, though, we would expect publishers to react to such a
policy by cutting prices in order retain their subscribers.
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supply of articles is inelastic, while the partial policy (if consistent with free publication
by authors) dominates the gold policy when the supply of articles is su¢ ciently elastic.49
This discussion in this section so far has focussed on the role of journals to distribute
content from authors to readers (task (iv) in the above taxonomy). Journals also add
value to the raw content, for instance in terms of certifying quality, attractive formatting,
providing feedback from referees to authors, and generally in polishingpapers for publi-
cation (task (iii)). Some of this added value benets readers. If a journal is not permitted
to charge readers, as in the gold regime, it cannot appropriate the extra benet it provides
readers in the form of higher prices, and so will have less incentive to spend resources on
such activities. Thus, we expect that an open access journal will provide expert feedback
from referees and editors and go through multiple rounds of revision only to the extent
this is valued by its authors (including the indirect impact on boosting readership insofar
as this is valued by authors), and the direct benet of such activity on readers is ignored
in the journals calculus.
If gold open access induces journals to scale back their activities aimed at adding value,
this may bring e¢ ciency benets. Recall from section 1.1 that there has been a trend
in many subjects towards more polishing of papers, arguably to an excessive extent. If
journals cannot charge readers, their revenue may not cover the costs of polishing without
charging authors a particularly high fee. As such, a gold policy might stimulate a move to
something more like a pure certicationrole for journals, which is less costly to perform
and which will plausibly deliver research to readers more quickly.50
There is a downside, however, to authors bearing the costs of processing papers, which
49These policy conclusions are similar to those corresponding to the regulation of call termination on
telephone networks, as discussed in Armstrong (2002, section 3.1). There, when the number of telephone
subscribers is inelastic it is optimal to regulate the price of call termination to be equal to marginal cost,
while if the supply of telephone subscribers is elastic it is optimal to set the price for termination above
cost and use the resulting prots to fund better deals for those subscribers.
50To illustrate, suppose there is single journal, and if it makes its authors expend e¤ort e on polishing its
cost per article is C(e) and its subscription revenue per article is R(e). If it charges authors a publication
fee p, as well as requiring e¤ort e, suppose the number of authors willing to publish is N(p + e). The
journals total prot is therefore N(p+ e) (p+R(e) C(e)). If we write P = p+ e for the total cost to
authors, this prot is N(P )(P+R(e) C(e) e). Thus, the journal chooses e to maximize R(e) C(e) e,
which involves strictly positive e if R increases su¢ ciently steeply. If regulation prohibited the journal
from charging readers, so that R = 0, the journals prot is N(P )  (P   C(e)   e), and choosing e = 0
maximizes prots.
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is that some authors may be unwilling or unable to pay even for a pure certication
service (task (ii)). More selective journals are likely charge higher author fees than less
selective journals in the gold regime, since they follow a more rigorous and costly peer-
review process. (By contrast, in the traditional subscription model, the extra costs of
peer-review are covered by readers.) As such, some authors with good papers may be less
willing or able to publish in selective journals. The result is that the quality signal in a
journals name becomes less precise, which harms readers and (good) authors.
A model of a market for article certication services is presented in section 5.2. However,
the issue can be illustrated as follows. An author has a paper which might be good or bad.
Readers in aggregate are willing to pay $10,000 to read an article known to be good, and
willing to pay nothing for an article known to be bad. An author knows the quality of her
paper, while readers cannot directly observe quality without investing in the costly e¤ort
of reading.51 Journals come in two forms: a discriminating journal will only publish a good
paper, while a non-discriminating journal will publish anything. Because of its reputation,
readers know whether a journal is discriminating or not. It costs a discriminating journal
$2,000 to determine if a paper is good or bad, but all other journal costs are zero. An
author enjoys some intrinsic benet from being seen to publish a good paper (if she has
one), and if she has a bad paper she will not submit to a discriminating journal since she
knows her paper will be rejected.
In an unregulated subscription-funded market, the outcome is that discriminating jour-
nals compete for good papers, a journal which attracts a good paper charges readers $10,000
to read the paper certied to be good, and allows an author to publish for free when she has
a good paper. Readers infer that a paper which appears in a non-discriminating journal
is bad, and wont read it (even if it is free). By contrast, if the author must publish in a
journal which allows free access to readers, a discriminating journal will charge her $2,000
to publish if she has a good paper. If her intrinsic benet from being seen to publish a
good paper is above her opportunity cost of funding the $2,000 publication fee, the out-
come is as before and good papers are all published in discriminating journals. However,
if this benet is below her opportunity cost, an author prefers to submit a good paper to a
51The assumption that an author accurately knows the quality of her article implies that there is no
di¤erence to an author between a submission fee and a publication fee.
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non-discriminating journal which charges her nothing.52 In this case, a reader must consult
a non-discriminating journal if she wants the article. If an uncertied article is relatively
likely to be good, it is worthwhile for readers to take the gamble of reading a paper in a
non-discriminating journal, although they su¤er the disutility of having to read some bad
papers alongside the good. If an uncertied article is unlikely to be good, though, readers
have no incentive to read undiscriminating journals at all, and some good papers will go
unnoticed.53
As before, a partial open access regime can overcome this danger. If the inferior variant
is not too close a substitute for the published article, a discriminating journal will be able
to cover its costs (including its costs of peer review) out of its subscription income, and
authors of good papers do not need to pay to have their article certied. As such, a green
policy may be compatible with authors continuing to publish in the most selective journal
that will accept their paper.
This simple model assumes that the journals name is the only signal of quality available
to readers. As discussed in section 1.1, though, nowadays readers have additional cues for
quality, including the number of citations an article receives. As a result, the certication
function of journals may be less important, and the danger of moving to the gold regime in
this regard may not be so severe. Nevertheless, early readers may rely on the journal name
as a signal. If non-discriminating journals are not read by early readers since they do not
contain a su¢ cient proportion of good articles, good articles in these journals do not pick
up citations and downloads, and so go unread by later readers as well. In this situation,
52For instance, within the PLOS group of open access journals, the highly selective PLOS Biology
charges authors $2900, while the less selective PLOS ONE charges $1350. It seems plausible that some
good biology papers are published in the latter due to the nancial constraints of some authors.
53This discussion focusses on how a di¤erential ability to pay a publication fee will cause some authors
with good papers to submit to non-discriminating journals in a gold regime, while in the subscription-
funded market they would submit to a discriminating journal. A similar outcome is seen in an alternative
framework where authors have only an imperfect signal of the quality of their article. In a subscription-
funded market, it is plausible that discriminating journal allow submission and publication for free, so that
even an author who thinks it unlikely her article will be accepted will try her luck. The result is that all
good papers appear in discriminating journals (although with possibly a signicant cost of peer review).
In a gold regime, the plausible outcome is that discriminating journals will charge for submission (and
also charge for publication if accepted). In this regime, an author who thinks it is unlikely her article is
good will not submit to a discriminating journal, with the result that some good papers will appear in
non-discriminating journals. In this alternative model, set against the welfare costs of less certication are
the possible e¢ ciency gains of not peer-reviewing papers which are unlikely to be good.
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journal certication continues to play an important and desirable role in determining a
papers eventual impact, and policy should not undermine the incentives to provide this
service.
3 The Evolution of Open Access
A full account of how access to scholarly knowledge has widened over time would include
the invention of the printing press, the adoption of vernacular language by scholars, the
birth of scientic journals in the seventeenth century to document new discoveries, the
introduction of public libraries and free museums, and the advent of radio and television.54
For our purposes, it is convenient to start in the 1990s when researchers rst used the
internet to distribute their work on a large scale.55
In 1991, the physicist Paul Ginsparg launched arXiv, a subject-based online repository
for physics, and later for mathematics, computer science and statistics. This currently hosts
nearly a million papers and has around six million article downloads per month. Three
years later was cognitive scientist Stevan Harnads subversive proposal that scholars
should make their research freely available on the internet, writing: For centuries, it was
only out of reluctant necessity that authors of esoteric publications made the Faustian
bargain to allow a price-tag to be erected as a barrier between their work and its (tiny)
intended readership because that was the only way to make their work public in the era
when paper publication [was] the only way to do so(Harnad, 1995).
Gold open access, in which journal articles themselves are freely available at the time
of publication, received a major boost with the launch in 2003 of the Public Library of
Science (PLOS) journal PLOS Biology, which was free to readers and which originally
charged $1,500 to authors. This journal has the highest impact factor in the biology
subject area in 2013 according to Thomson Reuters Citation Reports, belying suggestions
sometimes made that open access journals must be low quality. BioMed Central is another
open access publisher (now a subsidiary of Springer) which launched around the same
time, and it now has more than 250 open access journals in the science and medicine
54See Willinsky (2006), especially chapter 13, for an account of these developments.
55A much more detailed timeline of developments in open access is provided by Peter Suber at
legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/timeline.htm.
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area, with author fees mostly in the range £ 1000 to £ 1500. In 2004, Springer allowed
authors of articles in its subscription journals to pay $3,000 to make an article open access,
thus introducing hybrid journals. Similar open access options are now o¤ered by many
subscription journals, although it is by no means universal.56
A landmark for green open access was Elseviers decision in 2004 to permit an author
to self-archive the accepted version of her published paper (but not the publishers typeset
version) on her own website or home institutions repository without an embargo period.
(Depositing the accepted version in a centralised subject repository was generally not
permitted.) A representative from BioMed Central, which follows the rival gold route,
claimed that this kind of archiving is in many ways useless to the majority of scientists,
mainly because no one will know the copies exist at all or where to nd them.However,
Stevan Harnad was warmer, writing there will be the predictable cavils form the pedants
[...]. I, for one, am prepared to stoutly defend Elsevier on all these counts, and to say that
one could not have asked for more, and that the full benets of open access require not
one bit more - from the publisher.57
In the United States, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the principal public
funder of research in the biomedicine area, and its policies toward research dissemination
have played a large role in the open access debate. In 2005, after consultation (and lobby-
ing) in 2004, the NIH announced its new Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived
Publications Resulting from NIH-Funded Research, which stated NIH-funded investigators
are requested to submit an electronic version of the authors nal manuscript [...] as soon
as possible (and within twelve months of the publishers o¢ cial date of nal publication).
The relatively lengthy embargo period and the fact that authors were merely requested
to comply meant the policy had relatively little bite, and levels of compliance were low. In
2008, the NIH tightened its policy so that grant-holders were required to self-archive their
published research (again, with a twelve month embargo), and compliance substantially
56For instance, at the time of writing none of the top 5 economics journals (American Economic
Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Review of
Economic Studies) o¤er this option.
57Both this and the previous quote were reported in an article titled Reed allows academics free web
accessin The Guardian on 3 June 2004. Somewhat sourly, House of Commons (2004, pp. 57-8) suggested
that We are in little doubt that Elsevier timed the announcement of its new policy on self-archiving to
pre-empt the publication of this Report.
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increased.58 Many other research funders follow variants of this approach now, although
often with a six rather than twelve month embargo period.
Universities can also encourage their employees to self-archive. For example, since
2008 Harvard University has tried to ensure that its faculty deposit their work in the
universitys open access repository. However, the policy appears to be relatively weak,
since faculty are not strictly obliged to self-archive in the universitys repository, and there
are no consequences for failing to comply. As of 2011, half of the Harvards Faculty of Arts
and Sciences had deposited some document to the repository.59
In 2004, the UKs House of Commons Science and Technology Committee investigated
the market for scientic publications (House of Commons, 2004), and recommended fol-
lowing a green open access approach. Specically, they suggested (paragraph 115) that
universities be funded to establish institutional repositories, and wrote (paragraph 117)
that authors currently lack su¢ cient motivation to self-archive in institutional reposito-
ries. We recommend that the Research Councils and other Government funders mandate
their funded researchers to deposit of a copy of all their articles in their institutions repos-
itory within [...] a reasonable period to be agreed following publication, as a condition of
their research grant.The Government essentially refused to implement any of the main
recommendations in this report, and the committee clearly believed that business interests
had neutralised its recommendations.60 In retrospect, this was a missed opportunity,
since the committees recommendations were close to current policy in the UK.
In 2012, the UKs Finch group published its report on expanding access to journals,
which had been commissioned by government. This report, by contrast with the earlier
UK report and with most international policy, suggested following the gold route, and its
central recommendation was that a clear policy direction should be set towards support
for publication in open access or hybrid journals, funded by [author publication fees], as
the main vehicle for the publication of research, especially when it is publicly funded.
58In Richard Poynders website Open and Shut (visited 24 March 2014), the entry titled Open access
mandates: ensuring compliancereports that in the voluntary era before 2008, compliance with the NIH
request to self-archive was only 19%, while in the compulsory era the compliance rate was 75% by 2012.
59See Brand (2012) for further details of the Harvard policy. See Suber (2012, chapter 4) for an overview
of various mandate policies used by funders and universities.
60See paragraph 7 of Responses to the Committees Tenth Report, Session 2003-04, Scientic Publica-
tions: Free for all?
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Moreover, the report was cautious when it came to any green policies, suggesting that
funderslimitations on the length of embargo periods [...] should be considered carefully, to
avoid undue risk to valuable journals that are not funded in the main by [author publication
charges]and that it would be unreasonable to require embargo periods of less than twelve
months.61 In contrast to the previous report in 2004, the Government agreed in 2012 to
implement this report.62
There followed a period of confusion in UK policy, with the Research Councils changing
their stated policy a number of times. A subsequent Parliamentary report63 was strongly
critical of the governments adoption of the Finch Report, writing that At a time when the
budgets of [universities] are under great pressure, it is unacceptable that the Government
has issued, without public consultation, an open access policy that will require considerable
subsidy from research budgets in order to maintain journal subscriptions and cover [author
publication fees]. Signication public investment has already been made in institutional
repositories [...] and they could represent a more cost-e¤ective and sustainable route to
full open access, and We recommend that the Government and [Research Councils]
reconsider their preference for Gold open access.
At the time of writing, the policy of the UKs Research Councils is that a grant-
funded researcher must either follow the gold route, i.e., publish in a journal which allows
immediate and free access to the published article, or a green route by publishing in a
journal which allows her to self-archive the accepted version of her paper no more than six
months after publication (twelve months for humanities and social science subjects).64 In
addition, the Research Councils will make its contribution towards author publication fees
directly to universities (researchers cannot claim for publication fees in the grant itself),
who will then distribute these funds to researchers as they see t. There is also a clause
61See Finch et al. (2012, pp. 7, 8, 10).
62See the announcement gov.uk/government/news/government-to-open-up-publicly-funded-research.
63See House of Commons (2013, paras. 63 and 70).
64The justication for having longer embargoes for humanities and social science subjects is that articles
in these subjects often have longer half-lives than articles in many science subjects, and hence that
readers wish to consult these journals for longer. Thomson Reuters Citations Reports show that subjects
such as history, law or economics have citation half-lives (that is, the median age of a cited article in
the reference year) of more than 10 years, while medical subject areas such as endocrinology, oncology,
geriatrics have half-lives in the 6-7 year range. A journal with a long half-life will plausibly be commercially
hurt more with a given embargo period than one with a shorter half-life.
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stating that if funds for publication fees are not availableto the author, the author can
self-archive with longer embargo periods (12 months, or 24 months for humanities and
social science).65
Finally, open access will be required for the next research excellence framework in
the UK, which covers most important journal articles from authors based in the country
published after 2016. Similarly to the Research Councilspolicy, for a journal publication
to be submitted for the next review, the article must either appear without embargo from
the publisher itself, or the authors accepted version must be available from a suitable
repository no longer than 12 months after publication (24 months for humanities and
social sciences).66 In essence, this will make most of the journal articles originating in the
UK open access in some form, albeit with what seems like a very lengthy delay in many
subjects.
4 Conclusions
Without intervention, the scholarly journal market is likely to o¤er limited access to the
wider public, alongside high subscription charges for research institutions, while authors
can publish for free and many publishers reap high prots. The reason why publishers can
charge high subscriptions is not primarily due to aggregate concentration in the publishing
market, but rather that each peer-reviewed article makes a unique contribution and libraries
must pay whatever the journal asks to obtain access to this contribution. Since authors
care somewhat about the readership for their work, a publisher may not precisely maximize
revenue from readers, but temper its prices to ensure the journal is seen by the people the
author wants. Nevertheless, most authors do not care a great deal about being read by
the wider public, nor do they care particularly what libraries pay for their article so long
as they do subscribe, and the result is that journals can set high prices to libraries and
remain attractive to authors.
65See www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/outputs (accessed 25 March 2014) for details. It is a crucial detail
whether the 12 month or 24 month embargo period applies for a subject like economics. Many economics
journals allow self-archiving only after 24 months, and in such cases an author must either pay for gold
open access if that option is o¤ered, or if that option is not available the author cannot submit to that
journal at all.
66See hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/rsrch/rinfrastruct/oa/policy accessed 31 March 2014, for further details.
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This outcome has two related drawbacks: library budgets are siphoned o¤ by commer-
cial publishers, and smaller institutions and the wider public are excluded from research
ndings. These problems would be mitigated if many authors voluntarily self-archived
their papers, by posting the accepted version on the internet. However, the evidence is
that beyond a few subjects (including economics) many authors do not go to the trou-
ble to do this, which is not surprising if their article is anyway being distributed to their
desired audience by a journal.
These drawbacks are plausibly large enough to make some form of policy intervention
worthwhile, costly though that is in itself.67 Several forms of intervention can be contem-
plated. For instance, copyright on journal articles could be abolished, as suggested by
Shavell (2010). Libraries could be encouraged to form large consortia and use their result-
ing buyer power to mitigate the monopoly power of publishers. Alternatively, regulated
authors could be required to publish in journals which were cheapbut not necessarily
free, so that some upper bound on subscription charges is enforced.68
However, the two main kinds of intervention currently being implemented or considered
around the world are the green and gold routes to open access. Green open access
(as well as delayed open access) ensures that an inferior version of the published article is
made freely available to all readers, while gold open access makes the published version
freely and immediately available. If the inferior version is not too close a substitute to
the premium published version for instance, if the relevant embargo period is not too
short keen readers will still be willing to pay enough to cover the journals costs and
most authors can still publish for free. An open access policy requires regulated authors
to make their work available in the stipulated manner. This mandate might come from
the researchers grant funder, from her university, or at the national level. A funding body
can reasonably implement a more stringent policy than, say, a nationwide policy, since a
researchers decision to apply to a particular funder is voluntary, while a strict national
policy would unduly limit a researchers publishing options.
67Policy intervention might not be required if campaigns to boycott some commercial publishers (in
terms of withdrawing refereeing or editing services or by making it socially unacceptable to publish in
certain outlets) become su¢ ciently widespread to force these publishers to reduce subscription prices.
68For instance, the American Economic Associations collection of seven journals, including the premier
American Economic Review, currently o¤ers online institutional subscription for just $735. Likewise, a
high proportion of humanities journals are cheap but not open access.
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If an open access policy applies to signicant numbers of authors, publisher prots
will be a¤ected and publishers are likely to lobby against such policies (as we have already
seen). But this is not really a downside if an aim of policy is to transfer prot from publish-
ers back to the scholarly community. However, it is not only commercial publishers which
benet from high prot margins, but also many scholarly associations. Such associations
often run journals which are distributed by commercial publishers, with the prots from
subscriptions largely passed back to associations. These associations can use these prots
to fund conferences, scholarships, public awareness campaigns, and the like. Because many
associations depend so heavily on journal subscription income, they often actively lobby
against open access regulations.69 However, a principle of competition policy is that ex-
ploitative conduct cannot be justied by the use subsequently made of monopoly prots,
however benign. In any case, if the activities of the association are valuable, it should be
able to obtain funds directly from funding bodies rather than indirectly from libraries. It
would be a pity if the special interests of associations were an impediment to widening
access to research.70
There are a number of downsides specically to a green open access policy. While
not expensive, operating a repository for self-archiving involves some outlay,71 and it is
costly for a regulator to monitor compliance with a self-archiving mandate. Mandated self-
archiving imposes some limited costs of e¤ort on authors, and if only a subset of journals
comply with the requirements a mandate restricts an authors options for where to publish.
The hope is and much past experience suggests that most journals will adapt to a new
regime by allowing authors to self-archive within the stipulated period. But if the body
making policy is small relative to the world market, an international journal may not nd it
69House of Commons (2004, page 13) quotes the British Pharmacological Society as saying in 2002-
03 we spent over £ 850,000 on promoting and advancing pharmacology. Nearly £ 800,000 came from our
publishing activities. Without this income we should either have to raise funds in a di¤erent way or cease
to provide most of our current activities. See Willinsky (2006, chapter 4) for further discussion of this
topic.
70A similar point can be made with regard to university presses, some of which pass their excess prots
back to their university. Such universities may therefore be harmed by the widespread adoption of open
access.
71It currently costs about $800,000 per year to run the arXiv repository, and revenue for this comes
partly from large donations from Cornell University and the Simons Foundation, and partly from smaller
donations from a large number of member institutions. See arxiv.org for more information.
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worthwhile to change its policy.72 It is possible, though not inevitable, that a green policy
will result in fewer people reading the publishers version than before. This could mean
that readers do not always know which journal published a paper, and hence do not see
the quality signal the journal imparts. However, discovering the paper via Google scholar
almost always reveals the host journal, and so this cost to readers may not be great.
A gold policy brings greater benets, but also greater potential drawbacks. It is surely
of some benet to the reader to read the journal article itself: the format may be somewhat
more attractive, and she automatically knows the name of the journal which published the
paper and that she has the nal version. A subscription price which is precisely zero (rather
than merely cheap) will reduce some journal costs, notably the selling costs associated with
negotiating contracts with libraries. Relatedly, it is easier for regulators to ensure that
authors are complying with their open access obligations relative to a green regime.
Set against these benets, though, are potential problems caused by authors having to
pay to publish. First, there are sound public nance reasons why readers should contribute
something to the cost of publishing. Taking a parochial perspective, most readers of journal
articles written by authors in a small country will be overseas, and it is not obvious that
national taxes should be used to fund free access for these readers. Many readers of
scientic research are in the industrial and corporate sector, and it is unclear why all such
readers should free ride on a subsidised author-pays regime.73
If an author-pays policy is not to have a major impact on the supply of published
articles, many authors will need to have their publication fees subsidised. The details for
how to administer these fee subsidies are di¢ cult to formulate, and it is unclear how well
arrangements will work.74 If authors have publication fees paid automatically, there is a
72However, a journal could make exceptions to its prevailing copyright policy, for instance by allowing
papers funded from a particular source to be self-archived more quickly than other papers.
73House of Commons (2004, paragraph 175) reports that Elsevier obtains 20% of its journal revenue
from this sector, and quotes the Biochemical Society as saying in the open-access world it would appear
that the only real winners are going to be corporate pharmaceutical companies who would no longer have
to pay to access information.
74My university will receive £ 1.1 million from the Research Councils for the year 2013/14 to deliver the
Councilspolicy on open access. The university plans to devote 80% of this to support publication fees,
which it suggests will cover one-third to one-half of the relevant publications. It will prioritise applications
for these funds from grant-funded authors who wish to publish in an open access (not hybrid) journal or
wish to publish in a hybrid journal which has an embargo period for self-archiving beyond the Councils
stated limits. That is, low priority will be given to authors wishing to pay for open access in a subscription
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danger of moral hazard, and authors will choose to publish in expensive, high production-
standards journals with little regard for the extra cost in doing so. Perhaps more likely,
though, is that many authors will incur a personal cost in publishing a paper, either directly
out of their own pocket or in terms of having to use research funds which they value for
other purposes. The discouraging impact of publication fees is likely to felt more strongly
in some subject areas (such as the humanities, where research is rarely grant-funded) than
in others (such as biomedicine, where much research is supported by grants which include
payments for publication).
A claim is often made that an author-pays regime gives rise to a conict of interest for
journals, since they make money every time they accept a paper, and this will drive down
standards.75 This argument often reects special pleading by subscription journals, who
in any case also make more money (from libraries) when they publish more articles.
Perhaps a better way to think about this issue is that the demand for journal certi-
cation by authors may fall when authors pay to publish (as illustrated in the model in
section 5.2). In a subscription-funded market, authors of good papers can publish at lower
cost (or at least no higher cost) than authors with mediocre papers, and so an author has
an incentive to place her article in the most discriminating journal willing to accept it.
The result is that potential readers, as well as members of tenure and promotions commit-
tees, obtain a relatively precise signal of article quality from the journal in which a paper
appears. In an author-pays regime, it becomes more expensive to publish a paper in a dis-
criminating journal since peer-review costs are higher. As a result, some authors with good
papers particularly younger researchers with less access to research funds or researchers
in poorer countries may not be able to a¤ord the extra expense, and choose to submit
to a less prestigious journal. Readers and committees then have a less precise signal of
quality than before, and good papers may be lost amongst the mediocre. Nevertheless, it is
possible though far from inevitable that the certication role of journals may diminish
over time, as potential readers gain easy access to other cues of a papers quality (such as
journal when that journal permits adequate self-archiving. See openaccess.ox.ac.uk/applying-for-funding-
from-oxfords-rcuk-open-access-block-grant (accessed 26 March 2014) for details.
75In House of Commons (2004, page 80), Harold Varmus, a founder of PLOS, said this argument was
rubbish [...]. We have reviewers who make the determinations about what we are going to accept, who
have no direct interest in the fate of our journal, but the most important thing is that we [...] want our
journals to be high quality. It is the only way we are going to succeed.
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citations), in which case a decline in journal certication induced by author fees may not
be too costly.
In sum, there are good arguments to support both the green and gold routes to open
access. For the present, though, I suggest that a green (or delayed open access) policy which
makes research available to the public without undue delay delivers most of the benets
of full open access, without the signicant disruption involved in moving to a high-fee
author-pays regime. A policy whereby a regulated author is permitted to publish in a
journal with a cheap, rather than free, subscription also seems to merit more consideration
than it receives currently.
In the longer term, though, the cost of processing journal submissions may fall to such a
degree that a gold policy will not require high fees from authors. A move towards journals
o¤ering a pure certication service, rather than requiring multiple rounds of revision, will
reduce journal costs (and the required publication fees) and lessen the time spent on
writing referee reports. A light toucheditorial process will also reduce the delay from
submission to ultimate publication, and arguably accelerating access by readers to research
is as important as ensuring that the research is freely available once eventually published.
Certication could take the minimal form which ensures a paper is correct and does
not duplicate existing work the importance of a paper could then be gauged more by
its citations, say, than by the name of the journal or certication could be awarded only
to the very best submissions. Either way, open access journals which o¤er an unbundled
certication service are a vehicle for free and prompt access to research by readers, and at
a cost which should be a¤ordable one way or another to the majority of authors.
5 Appendix: Models of Journal Publishing
5.1 A model of dissemination
The model presented here illustrates three issues: why the traditional reader-paysbusi-
ness model is the equilibrium outcome in an unregulated journal market; why the reader-
paysmodel leads to prices which might greatly exceed associated costs and to super-
normal publishing prots, even in an unconcentrated journal market, and why regulatory
intervention to achieve open access can help to overcome the monopoly pricing problem.
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There are an unlimited number of identical journals which publish papers submitted by
authors and distribute them to readers. Each journal incurs a cost f for processing each
article, but there is no cost for distributing an article to readers. The peer-review process
ensures that a published article is strongly di¤erentiated from every other article, and so
a readers willingness-to-pay for one article does not depend on whether the reader has
access to other articles. We assume that a reader values each article equally, and a type-v
reader is willing to pay up to v for each article they read.76 (In section 5.2 we discuss
a scenario where articles di¤er in quality.) There are two kinds of reader: libraries, of
which in the relevant jurisdiction there are n in number and which are each prepared to
pay up to vH for any published article, and the wider public, who are m in number and
who are each prepared to pay vL per published article. We suppose that information or
arbitrage constraints mean that a journal must charge all readers the same price.77
A number of authors in the relevant jurisdiction each have a paper. Authors care that
their article reaches the libraries. For instance, an author cares that fellow researchers
can read her article, and researchers have access to journals via their libraries. However,
we assume authors gain no further benet from reaching the wider public. Given that
journals are available in libraries, authors view journals as perfect substitutes as vehicles
to disseminate their work and will choose the journal with the lowest publication fee. We
suppose that a journal cannot pay an author when it publishes her article, and it charges
the publication fee p  0 to its authors. If authors have to pay p to publish their paper in
equilibrium, suppose that N(p) authors choose to publish. In general, N() is a decreasing
function, reecting that authors may have heterogeneous access to funds or obtain di¤erent
benets from publishing. Suppose that V (p) is the associated net aggregate surplus of
authors in the jurisdiction when the publication fee is p, which satises V 0(p)   N(p).
An author can bypass the dissemination function of journals by self-archiving a version
of their paper. However, suppose that authors incur a small private cost when self-archiving
their work, and so will not voluntarily do so if their article is anyway available in libraries
76The simplifying assumption that a reader has the same willingness-to-pay for each article implies there
is no incentive for publishers to bundle articles or journals. Relatedly, it implies we can consider open
access regulations for each article separately.
77If a publisher could set di¤erent prices to the two kinds of reader, rst degree price discrimination
would be possible, and all readers would be served (although all their surplus would be extracted).
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and they can publish for free.
Suppose that
nvH > (n+m)vL ; (1)
which ensures that a journal obtains more revenue from selling only to libraries than it
does from selling to all readers. Suppose also that
nvH > f ; (2)
so that the revenue from selling to libraries covers the cost of running a journal.
The unique equilibrium in an unregulated market is easily derived. Given assumption
(1), a journal makes the most revenue from readers by selling only to libraries. Moreover,
an author obtains no benet from reaching the wider public, nor does she care intrinsically
about the price a library pays, and so a journal obtains no competitive advantage from
o¤ering to supply the wider public or from o¤ering to set a low price to libraries. We
deduce that each journal will choose a subscription charge P = vH to extract all library
surplus. Since each article then generates prot nvH   f , a journal has a strong incentive
to attract authors. Since an author will choose the journal with the lowest publication fee,
it is clear that the only equilibrium publication fee is zero. (If not, then a publisher has
an incentive to undercut the prevailing positive fee a little, and attract all authors.)
The outcome in the unregulated market favours authors at the expense of readers:
authors can publish for free, while readers either have all surplus extracted or are not
served at all. Journals make prot nvH   f > 0 per article published.78 Suppose that
publisher prot is worth nothing in the welfare calculation, and we are only interested in
the sum of author and reader surplus in the jurisdiction. Therefore, welfare when authors
are not regulated is
W1 = V (0) ; (3)
78If there was an exogenous constraint that authors cannot be paid, the equilibrium would instead be
that publisher prots are passed back to authors, who are paid nvH   f for their article. The outcome for
readers is unchanged. In the model presented, the equilibrium is somewhat knife-edge, in that authors
are precisely indi¤erent between all journals, and if a journal could somehow improve its o¤er to authors
it could attract much protable business. (For instance, a journal might compete on its turnaround time,
or attractive layout, or by giving a mug to an author.) This drawback could be overcome in an extended
model where authors viewed journals as being slightly di¤erentiated, say. The fact remains that many
commercial publishers are highly protable, suggesting that there is some barrier to prot dissipation in
this market.
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since readers obtain no surplus in equilibrium.
Note that an open access journal cannot succeed in this unregulated market. If it does
not charge readers, it must cover its costs by charging authors instead, and no author would
be prepared to pay a positive price instead of publishing for free.79 A journal would not
wish its authors to self-archive their paper since that would reduce a librarys willingness-
to-pay for access (see below). But since authors incur a small cost to self-archive and enjoy
no extra benet from doing so, there is no need for a journal to prohibit self-archiving.
Consider a partialopen access regime in which regulated authors in the jurisdiction
are required to make an inferior version of the published paper freely available, either by
publishing in a journal with delayed open access or by self-archiving their own version of
the article. (In the latter case, since there is a small cost involved in self-archiving, authors
need to be mandated to do this.) If a reader has valuation v for the published version of
a paper, suppose that this reader has valuation v for reading the inferior variant instead,
where  < 1 is the same for all readers. If the reader charge is P , a reader with valuation
v will pay for the published version rather than read the free version if v   P  v, i.e., if
P  (1  )v. Under the same condition (1), a journal prefers to sell only to libraries, but
its subscription charge can now be no higher than (1   )vH . The parameter  captures
the extent to which the free version cannibalises a journals revenue from libraries.
If  is small enough that
n(1  )vH  f ; (4)
this reduced revenue from libraries is still su¢ cient to cover the journals cost. The equi-
librium with this form of regulation is that regulated authors are still charged nothing to
publish, libraries pay the reduced price (1 )vH to have access to the premium published
version, while the wider public can access the inferior version for free. Putting this together
implies that total welfare in this regime is80
W2 = V (0) +N(0)[nvH +mvL] (5)
Thus, since the extra term in (5) is positive, a requirement to make an inferior version
79If some authors did intrinsically care su¢ ciently about reaching the wider public, some journals would
voluntarily set a low enough reader price to induce all readers to subscribe.
80We suppose that the authors cost of self-archiving, where relevant, is small enough that it can be
ignored when calculating welfare.
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freely available boosts total welfare in this model. The gain comes from two sources: the
wider public is able to read the inferior version, while before they were excluded altogether,
and a library is charged (1 )vH to access the published version, and so enjoys net surplus
vH . The policy has no signicant impact on authors, who can publish for free and reach
their desired audience in any case. In sum, this partial open access policy both expands
readership and transfers a fraction  of prots from publishers to libraries.81
Consider next the goldopen access regime, where regulated authors must publish in
journals which o¤er readers immediate access for free. Here, journals will emerge to cater
to the regulation-induced demand by authors for open access, and the equilibrium involves
authors paying the cost of the journal, so that p = f , and these journals obtain no prot.
The welfare of readers and authors in the jurisdiction is now
W3 = V (f) +N(f)[nvH +mvL] : (6)
The impact of the policy is that all readers have free access to published research, publisher
prots from distributing these regulated papers are eradicated, but the number of published
articles may fall. If the supply of articles is inelastic, so that N(f)  N(0), then V (f) 
V (0) N(0)f , and (6) implies
W3  V (0) +N(0) [nvH +mvL   f ] :
Given (4), welfare with the gold policy is then higher than in both the unregulated market
(3) and the partial regime (5). Publisher prots obtained in the unregulated market are
fully transferred to the academic sector of authors and libraries (although within this sector
there is a transfer from authors to libraries), and the wider public has free access to the
published version of research.
However, this welfare ranking is changed if the supply of articles is su¢ ciently elastic.
Since authors are worse o¤ in the gold regime relative to the partial regime, a su¢ cient
condition for welfare to be lower in the gold regime than the partial regime is that readers
are worse o¤. However, readers are worse o¤ in the gold regime if and only if
N(f)[nvH +mvL] < N(0)[nvH +mvL] ;
81If the jurisdiction is small, then the policy will have an impact on the rest of the world too, in that
readers elsewhere will have access to the inferior variant of the regulated authors paper, and the journal
will have to reduce its prices to libraries in the rest of the world.
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i.e., if the quality adjustednumber of published articles is higher in the partial regime so
thatN(f) < N(0). This condition is satised if the supply of articles contracts su¢ ciently
when author fees are introduced.
In practice, in a partial open access regime, the policy-maker can choose how inferior
the free version is, so that  is endogenous. For example, the length of embargo period
determines how close a substitute the free version is to the published paper. As  varies
from 0 to 1, the partial policy nests the unregulated market ( = 0) and the gold policy
( = 1) as polar cases. This analysis shows that policy should at least choose  high enough
that (4) just binds and authors can continue to publish for free. So long as there is no
impact on the supply of published articles, welfare is improved when the wider public can
enjoy a better version of the research and when more prot is transferred to libraries. It is
possible that welfare can be improved further by choosing  even higher, so that authors
are required to contribute to journal costs, but that calculation requires a more delicate
analysis of the elasticity of article supply.
5.2 A model of certication
The previous model focussed on the dissemination task performed by journals. Another
important task is to certify the quality of papers they publish. Journals earn a reputation
for being selective, and the fact that a paper is published in a particular journal is infor-
mative about its likely quality. As discussed in section 1.1, ex ante information about an
articles quality is valuable to readers because that helps them better target their reading
e¤orts. Likewise, certication is valuable to authors of good papers, as being published in a
discriminating journal enhances this authors reputation among those who do not already
know the authors work directly and also makes people more likely to read and cite their
paper.
Suppose that there are two kinds of article, goodones with quality qH and mediocre
ones with quality qL. An author knows the quality of her article ex ante, but has no control
over whether her article is good or mediocre. By incurring cost c > 0, which might be
interpreted as the cost of a peer review process, a journal can accurately determine an
articles quality. A journal can be one of two types: a discriminatingjournal publishes
only good articles and incurs the evaluation cost c per submission and cost f per publica-
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tion, while a non-discriminatingjournal publishes any article submitted, and so incurs
only the cost f per publication. Readers and authors are assumed to be able to observe
which journals are discriminating and which are not, perhaps because they have consulted
journals in the past or because they know a journals impact factor or similar. We assume
that an author of a mediocre paper will not submit to a discriminating journal, so that
that journals cost per article published is f + c.82 (This assumption can be justied by
supposing that authors dislike delay in publication, and the author of a mediocre article
knows she will not succeed at a discriminating journal.) There is an unlimited supply of
both types of journal.
Suppose that an author obtains reputational benet b(q) if she publishes an article
which is perceived to have (average) quality q, where b() is an increasing function, and
authors do not care directly about the readership of their article. Suppose that a journal
can extract revenue rH from the population of readers for an article known to be good,
and revenue rL from an article known to be bad. All articles published in a discriminating
journal are known to have quality qH , while an article in a non-discriminating journal has
expected quality which depends on the proportion of good and mediocre articles submitted
in equilibrium. We focus on the case where
rH  f + c ; (7)
so that an article in a discriminating journal generates su¢ cient revenue from readers to
cover its cost of publication and peer review.
The equilibrium outcome in an unregulated market is for all good papers to appear in
discriminating journals. Given assumption (7), competition for authors with good papers
by discriminating journals implies that the author fee is driven down to zero and such an
author obtains payo¤ b(qH). Such an author could instead choose to publish in a non-
discriminating journal. In this candidate equilibrium, readers believe that a paper in a
non-discriminating journal is surely mediocre, and so publishing in a non-discriminating
82A subtle issue for the model as described is that, given it infers that all its submissions will consist of
good papers, a discriminating journal actually need not go to the costly e¤ort of peer-review and could
simply publish all submitted papers. However, a richer model would overcome this problem. (For instance,
an author plausibly is unsure of the quality of her article, and so will try her luck at a discriminating journal
if it is free to submit there.)
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journal yields the author reputational benet b(qL). As a result, the payo¤ to the author
is at most b(qL) since she might also have to pay a publication fee. Therefore, in this
candidate equilibrium the author of a good paper has no incentive to deviate and to
publish in a non-discriminating journal. (The author of a mediocre article cannot publish
in a discriminating journal since her article will be rejected, and that deviation need not
be considered.) It is thus an equilibrium for all good papers to appear in discriminating
journals. A related argument shows there can be no equilibrium in which some good papers
appear in non-discriminating journals, and so this is the unique equilibrium.
What happens to authors of mediocre papers in this equilibrium depends on how much
revenue such a paper generates. If rL  f , then even a mediocre article generates revenue
from readers su¢ cient to cover a non-discriminating journals cost. In this case, all authors
can publish for free. However, if rL < f , then authors of mediocre papers will have to
contribute to the cost of publication, and in equilibrium they are each charged p = f rL. In
the extreme case where an article known to be mediocre is of no interest to readers, so that
rL = 0, these authors must cover the full cost of publishing. A non-discriminating journal
can then style itself open accesswithout losing reader revenue. In an unregulated market,
the equilibrium then involves good articles being published in discriminating reader-pays
journals for free, while authors of mediocre articles pay for their work to appear in non-
discriminating open access journals.
As in section 5.1, suppose that a partial open access policy requires an inferior version
of the published paper to be made freely available, where this inferior version is viewed
by a reader who values the published article at v as having value v. (In particular, in
the case of a green policy where the author makes her own version of the published paper
available, we assume that a reader who is considering whether to read the self-archived
paper knows the journal in which it is published, either by checking directly or because the
author is required to state the journal when she self-archives.) As a result, for i = L;H
revenue is shifted down from ri to (1  )ri. In this case, a similar equilibrium to that in
the unregulated market is seen, provided that  is small enough that
(1  )rH  f + c ;
so that a discriminating journal can cover its costs without charging authors. In particular,
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all good papers appear in discriminating journals, and potential readers have an accurate
signal of quality from the journal in which the article appears. Provided that it allows
discriminating journals to cover their costs from subscriptions alone, a partial policy has
no adverse impact on the certication services provided in the market. As before, the policy
enables all potential readers to access the research and transfers prot from publishers to
those readers who choose to pay for the published version.
With gold open access regulation, an author bears the cost of publishing and certi-
cation. Competition between journals implies that the author publication fee at a dis-
criminating journal is f + c, while at a non-discriminating journal the fee is f . Thus, a
crucial di¤erence between a reader-pays and an author-pays regime is that in the former
case publication fees tend to be lower at discriminating journals, while the latter has the
opposite pattern.
With the gold policy, an author with a good paper will choose to publish in a discrimi-
nating journal only if the additional reputational benet of publishing in a discriminating
outlet outweighs the disutility of paying the extra publication fee. Such an author may
choose to publish in a non-discriminating journal if her opportunity cost of research (or
private) funds is su¢ ciently high.83 Since now some good articles are published in non-
discriminating journals, readers have a less precise signal about articles quality than they
did in the unregulated market. For instance, if mediocre articles are worthless, no one
would ever read a non-discriminating journal in the unregulated market. In the gold open
access regime, though, a reader will either have to sift through these journals to nd the
fraction of good papers they contain, or ignore these journals altogether, which means the
good articles in them go unnoticed.
5.3 Related economic models of publishing
Shavell (2010) presents a model of the academic market which is similar to that in section
5.1. In particular, he also focusses on the case where the journal market is competitive, and
where potentially high revenues from selling the journal to readers are passed onto authors
in the form of a subsidised charge for publishing. Shavell supposes that all authors write
83Alternatively, di¤erent authors may place di¤erent weight on reputation, so that the function b(q) may
be less steep for some authors, who then are not prepared to pay the extra for a better reputation.
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articles of equal quality (that is, readers have the same demand function for each article)
but di¤er in how much they value readership. Authors who value having many readers will
choose a contract with a low reader price (and so relatively large publication fee), while
authors who care little for readers opt for a contract with a revenue-maximising reader
price and are paid for their work. In contrast to the model in section 5.1, Shavell does not
impose the constraint that authors cannot be paid to publish, and so his publishers make
zero prots in equilibrium and some authors are paid to publish.
In the model in section 5.1, I assumed that authors cared only about their work being
read by a subset of high-value readers. In technical terms, this was a device to ensure that
journals had no incentive to attract authors by o¤ering a wider readership. (If authors
cared about reaching each additional reader, journals would be forced to dissipate all
prots by o¤ering authors the widest audience.) Another way to shut down competition
for authors via readership is to suppose that journals cannot commit to their subscription
charge, as in McCabe and Snyder (2014). (For instance, publishers might negotiate terms
with individual libraries, and there is no public subscription price which authors can
observe.) In their model, excess prots are again retained by subscription journals.
McCabe and Snyder (2005) present a model of a monopoly prot-maximizing journal
that chooses which articles to publish and how much to charge the two sides of the inter-
action. (They assume that authors do not know the quality of their article at the time of
submission.) They nd that the better the journal is at picking out the good articles the
higher is its charge to readers (and the lower its charge to authors). They interpret this as
implying that a less expert journal is more likely to o¤er open access.
Jeon and Rochet (2010) also consider a market with a single journal, which chooses
the quality threshold for the papers it accepts. In their model, they nd that the socially
optimal way to price to the two sides is to have open access (see their Proposition 2). One
reason for this unambiguous result, however, is that they do not require the journal to
break even; if revenues from the two sides must cover the journals cost, it may be optimal
to charge readers for access so that authors are not unduly discouraged from publishing
by high publication fees. The rest of their paper mostly studies the case where the journal
aims to maximize its readerswelfare. However, closer to the focus in the current paper,
in their appendix they also study a for-prot monopoly journal. (The framework I present
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in section 5.2 is quite similar to Jeon and Rochets model. Articles are either good or
bad where a badpaper has benet to the reader which is below her reading cost and
they assume that an author knows her quality in advance.) They nd that a subscription
journal will never accept bad papers, since that diminishes a readers willingness-to-pay for
the journal. However, in an author-pays regime the journal may accept a portion of bad
papers, as it cares less about pandering to reader interests. As a result, open access may
be associated with a fall in standards, just as the competitive market studied in section
5.2 exhibited a noisier signal of quality in an author-pays than a reader-pays regime.84
McCabe, Snyder and Fagin (2013) study a model with two authors and two readers.
One author cares about reaching readers (valuing each reader at a) while the other does
not and publishes only if it costs nothing to do so; one reader has a value r from seeing
any article, while the other does not and can be reached only with open access. Suppose
it costs f to process each paper and disseminate it to any number of readers.85 There
are ve strategies that a prot-maximizing monopoly journal might follow: (i) publish one
article and sell to one reader, which yields prot a+ r  f ; (ii) publish one article but with
open access to both readers, which yields prot 2a   f , (iii) publish two articles and sell
both to one reader, which yields prot 2r  2f , (iv) publish two articles with open access,
which yields negative prot  2f , or (v) follow a hybridstrategy, and o¤er the author
who does not care about readers free publication and whose article can be read by one
paying reader, and o¤er the author who does care about readership open access in return
for a publication fee, which yields prot a+ r 2f .86 Thus, the journal has no incentive to
follow the hybrid strategy, which is dominated by strategy (i).87 However, if policy forced
the journal to o¤er some form of open access, i.e., to follow one of the strategies (ii), (iv)
or (v), the journal may prefer the hybrid option to the full open access policy.
84Jeon and Rochet do not investigate whether an author-pays or reader-pays regime (or a mixture of the
two) is observed in an unregulated monopoly market, but rather they derive the price to one side given
an exogenous constraint that the other side has free access.
85In fact, McCabe et al. suppose there is a constant cost of distributing the paper to each reader.
86Since the author who cares about readership could mimic the other author (who has access to a single
reader for free), the journal can only charge a publication fee of a to this author.
87In richer frameworks it would be optimal to o¤er a di¤erent readership to di¤erent authors, i.e.,
to follow a hybrid strategy. A general version of this situation would have authors di¤ering in their
demandfor readers and readers di¤ering in their demand for papers, and a monopoly journal solves a
two-sided screening problem in which the volume of demand on the two sides must coincide. For a model
with this avour, see Gomes and Pavan (2014).
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